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THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW CRIME OF 
CORRUPTION* 
LISA KERN GRIFFIN** 
This contribution to the North Carolina Law Review’s 2010 
symposium, Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal Systems, considers 
the compatibility between the common law nature of honest services 
fraud and the dynamic quality of public integrity offenses. Corruption 
enforcement became a focal point of recent debates about 
overcriminalization because it typifies expansive legislative mandates 
for prosecutors and implicit delegations to courts. Federal prosecutions 
of political corruption have relied primarily on an open-textured 
provision: 18 U.S.C. § 1346, the honest services extension of the mail 
fraud statute. Section 1346 raises notice concerns because it contains 
few self-limiting terms, but it has also acquired some principled 
contours through common law rulemaking. Those boundaries are 
consistent with an animating principle of public corruption 
prosecutions: ensuring detached decisionmaking in the public interest. 
The distortive potential of significant personal financial gain may best 
distinguish actionable corruption from ordinary political dealings. 
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Skilling, Black, 
and Weyhrauch trio of cases in part to consider the link between harm 
and liability for honest services fraud, the Court did not address the 
issue, instead simply limiting the statute to bribes and kickbacks. 
Recent public corruption prosecutions illustrate some shortcomings of 
that decision and indicate that the courts could better confine honest 
services fraud by building on the harm constraint that had begun to 
emerge through the common law. The concluding sections here explore 
both the way in which a purposive interpretation might limit honest 
services prosecutions and the extent to which unanswered questions in 
the Skilling decision still allow for development of the harm concept. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public corruption describes a complex set of crimes that covers 
offense conduct far beyond the paradigm form of a vote purchased 
with cash in a brown paper bag or an official dipping into public 
coffers. It often entails layers of transactions and deferred exchanges 
of benefits.1 And the damage caused by corrupt official action 
generally involves diffuse social consequences rather than material 
economic injury. It may cause substantial harm, but only through 
indirect losses, borne only by constructed victims.  
Regulating public integrity thus requires a dynamic enforcement 
response. That response has been framed by the theory that federal 
prosecutions for fraud protect not only concrete money and property 
rights but also intangible rights like the loyalty of government officials 
to their constituents. “Honest services fraud” emerged from common 
law rulemaking and has expanded and contracted through judicial 
interpretation, legislative clarification, and executive self-regulation. 
As detailed below, courts endorsed early prosecutorial extensions of 
the mail and wire fraud statutes to intangible harms until the 
 
 1. Former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, for example, was charged in a 4-
defendant, 24-count, 112-page indictment alleging various acts of political corruption. See 
Second Superseding Indictment at 1, 7–40, 105, 112, United States v. Blagojevich, 662 F. 
Supp. 2d 998 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (No. 08 CR 888). In addition to honest services charges, the 
indictment alleged racketeering conspiracy, wire fraud, extortion conspiracy, attempted 
extortion, and false statements. See id. at 7–43, 67–78, 88–96. Although some of the 
allegations involved Blagojevich directly promising or threatening official action in 
exchange for benefits, most of the alleged corruption took the form of more complex 
transactions. See, e.g., id. at 26–27. Blagojevich associates, for example, allegedly assisted 
other parties in gaining some influence over the investment activity of the State of Illinois 
Teachers’ Retirement System pension plan. Those third parties then directed both 
investments and related legal work to firms selected by the Blagojevich associates. In 
exchange, the firms would make campaign contributions to Blagojevich. Id. at 9. 
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Supreme Court’s decision in McNally v. United States,2 which limited 
fraud prosecutions to offenses involving the deprivation of property. 
Congress responded with 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which codified a definition 
of mail and wire fraud that includes “a scheme or artifice to deprive 
another of the intangible right of honest services.”3 In the twenty-year 
period that followed, courts gave some meaning to the deprivation of 
honest services by adopting various limiting interpretations, some of 
which focused on the nature of the damage the corruption caused or 
risked. The Skilling, Black, and Weyhrauch trio of cases last term 
offered an opportunity to synthesize and clarify the role of harm. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in part to consider that issue but 
instead concluded that vagueness problems could be addressed by 
limiting § 1346’s scope to bribes and kickbacks.4 Imposing workable 
limits on the honest services theory, however, may require a more 
integrated approach that is consistent with the purposes of 
prosecuting corruption and compatible with its common law origins. 
Part I describes the development of honest services fraud and 
various attempts to impose narrowing constructions on the theory. 
Part II explains the fit between context-dependent corruption 
prosecutions and common law rulemaking. Although there are 
serious objections to delegating the task of defining crimes,5 and 
many valid critiques of flexibility in the criminal law,6 public 
corruption prosecutions display some of the advantages of judicial 
rulemaking and analogical reasoning. Corruption itself may be 
difficult to define with any precision, but the harm that it causes to 
the political process—leverage over public officials that precludes 
neutral decisionmaking—can signal actionable offense conduct. Part 
 
 2. 483 U.S. 350 (1987), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508, as recognized in Skilling v. United States, 130 S. 
Ct. 2896, 2904 (2010). 
 3. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)). 
 4. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010). 
 5. Cf. Richard E. Myers II, Complex Times Don’t Call for Complex Crimes, 89 N.C. 
L. REV. 1849, 1851 (2011) (critiquing delegations to agencies that render “as yet undefined 
conduct criminal”). 
 6. See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of 
Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 245 (1985) (“Case-by-case criminalization, whether 
accomplished under the rubrics of the common law or the aegis of a modern statute, 
threatens both the general values of regularity and evenhandedness in the administration 
of justice and our more specific societal commitment to equality before the law.”); 
Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1102 
(1952) (arguing that some amount of discretion is essential to the prosecutorial function 
but that its existence “cannot be accepted as a substitute for a sufficient law”). 
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III argues that a renewed focus on harm has the potential to maintain 
a dynamic standard while also addressing notice concerns and 
disquiet about excessive prosecutorial discretion.7 
I.  CRIMINALIZING DISHONEST GOVERNMENT 
The enforcement challenges of public corruption cases have 
made the generous language of mail fraud the first place that federal 
prosecutors turn when drafting an indictment.8 There is no parallel to 
the federal fraud statute that focuses on the general problem of 
political corruption, but there are narrower provisions that 
criminalize various self-enriching actions by public officials. For 
example, a federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, includes the 
element of a quid pro quo (a direct link between the bribe and some 
official act).9 That requirement often makes bribery a difficult charge 
to prove,10 as the multifactor decisionmaking in which public officials 
engage can preclude proof of the link to an illicit benefit. A similar 
narrowing construct also appears in some applications of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 666, the statute that proscribes theft and bribery by local 
government officials in connection with programs that receive federal 
funds.11 The Hobbs Act supplies additional theories to combat threats 
 
 7. For some classic formulations of the “harm principle” as it relates to the criminal 
law, see 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO 
OTHERS 11 (1984); see also DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW 66 (2008) (arguing for an internal constraint on overcriminalization 
in the form of a nontrivial harm or evil requirement); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 
70 (Michael B. Mathias ed., Pearson Longman 2007) (1859) (“[T]he only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”); John Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, 
in HARM AND CULPABILITY 103, 127 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996) 
(“[H]armless immoralities should not be officially prohibited or punished . . . .”). 
 8. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 
1553 (2008) (“Federal fraud law is very broad, and its breadth is driven in part by an 
agenda of maintaining supple legal tools to deal with inventive and resourceful persons 
determined to appropriate the interests of others.”). 
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). 
 10. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999) 
(“[F]or bribery there must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive 
something of value in exchange for an official act.”); United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144, 
149 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[B]ribery involves the giving of value to procure a specific official 
action from a public official.”). 
 11. Section 666 prohibits bribery involving state and local officials employed by 
agencies that receive more than $10,000 in federal program grants. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006). 
It includes a “corrupt intent” requirement, although not a quid pro quo limitation, and it 
has been read recently to cover payments made with the intention to produce future, as 
yet unidentified, favors. Id.; see United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1188 (11th Cir. 
2010) (“To accept the defendants’ argument would permit a person to pay a significant 
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and extortion by government officials,12 and the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act applies to the bribery of foreign officials.13 There are 
corresponding administrative provisions and ethics canons, and each 
state has its own bribery statutes as well. Despite these parallel 
provisions and additional layers of enforcement—including lobbying 
and campaign finance regulations and state and federal conflict-of-
interest provisions14—the mail and wire fraud statutes have been the 
“principal vehicle” for the development of public corruption law.15 
A. Honest Services Fraud 
The prohibitions on mail and wire fraud—codified in 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1341 and 134316—had traditionally been moored to the deprivation 
of money or property. The evolvability of the fraud provisions, 
however, has long been recognized as a core characteristic; they were 
drafted with sufficient mutability to address “the new varieties of 
fraud that the ever-inventive American ‘con artist’ is sure to 
develop.”17 The fraud statute’s original House sponsor spoke in 
sweeping terms of its design to “prevent the frauds which are mostly 
gotten up in the large cities . . . by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions 
 
sum to a County employee intending the payment to produce a future, as yet unidentified 
favor without violating § 666. The requirement of a ‘corrupt’ intent in § 666 does narrow 
the conduct that violates § 666 but does not impose a specific quid pro quo requirement.”), 
cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2011) (No. 10-533). 
 12. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006). 
 13. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006).  
 14. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A) (2006) (authorizing criminal prosecution of 
campaign finance violations); 18 U.S.C. §§ 203–209 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (conflict-of-
interest statutes). 
 15. John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427, 453 (1998). 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) imposes penalties on anyone who devises or intends to 
devise “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006)—first 
adopted in 1952—states: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, 
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of 
wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any 
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such 
scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 
years, or both. 
 17. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405–07 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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generally, for the purposes of deceiving and fleecing the innocent 
people of the country.”18 
Section 1341 broadly proscribes any “scheme or artifice to 
defraud,” and “defraud” has a sufficiently “generative character” that 
courts have extended the statute to “emerging forms of misconduct” 
without additional legislation.19 Thus, beginning in the 1940s and then 
with greater frequency by the 1970s, courts acquiesced in prosecutors’ 
use of the fraud laws to pursue more abstract harms to the ideal of 
honest and disinterested government. They “readily accepted the 
proposition that a deprivation of the honest services owed by a 
fiduciary constituted the fraudulent taking that is normally associated 
with larceny, and therefore sufficient to establish a scheme to 
defraud.”20 
Once courts agreed that prosecutors could pursue charges 
against officials who deprived the public of their faithful services, the 
theory “quickly overgrew the legal landscape in the manner of the 
kudzu vine until by the mid-1980s few ethical or fiduciary breaches 
seemed beyond its potential reach.”21 But despite concerns about its 
increasing span, every federal court of appeals to consider the 
constitutionality of the intangible rights theory of fraud, over the 
course of almost fifty years of litigation, upheld it against vagueness 
challenges.  
In the 1987 McNally case, however, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the statute did not protect “the intangible right of the 
citizenry to good government” and that mail fraud schemes required 
 
 18. Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The Changing 
Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 442 (1995) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 
41ST CONG., 3D SESS. 35 (1870) (statement of Rep. John Farnsworth) (concerning a bill 
similar to the mail fraud provision that was introduced in the preceding Congress)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 19. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crime, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 
377; see also United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that the 
fraud statutes “were intentionally written broadly to protect the mail and, later, the wires 
from being used to initiate fraudulent schemes”); Henning, supra note 18, at 465 (“By not 
defining the scope of the statute, Congress can hide behind a general legislative grant of 
authority to prosecutors to ‘call them as they see them.’ ”); Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal 
Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 783 (1980) (“On its face, the wording of 
the statute explains in large part how the courts came to attribute to the crime of mail 
fraud many of the qualities that, when viewed in light of the statute’s very different 
present-day wording seem so peculiar.”). 
 20. PETER HENNING & LEE RADEK, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF PUBLIC 
CORRUPTION 153 (2011). 
 21. Coffee, supra note 15, at 427. 
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a deprivation of “money or property.”22 McNally involved two 
Kentucky officials who had directed the state to buy workers’ 
compensation insurance through a particular agent. That agent 
shared commissions with another agency that was partly owned by 
one of the officials. Kentucky received legitimate insurance policies, 
and the government did not allege that the state paid inflated 
premiums, but the officials also profited from the transactions.23 They 
were convicted of having “defrauded the citizens and government of 
Kentucky of . . . the right to have the Commonwealth’s affairs 
conducted honestly.”24 The Court overturned the conviction because 
of the absence of any measurable economic loss and then instructed 
Congress to “speak more clearly” if it intended the fraud statute to 
reach beyond the protection of property rights to broader violations 
of public fiduciary duties.25 
Congress responded the same year with passage of § 1346, which 
specified that honest services violations indeed fell within the 
definition of fraud.26 The legislation added virtually no substance 
beyond codification of the court-made intangible rights theory. The 
statutory language was inserted in an omnibus drug bill on the same 
day that the provision was passed by both the House and the Senate.27 
It was never referred to any committee, discussed in any 
congressional report, or debated on the floor.28 The only indication of 
legislative intent is the desire to overturn McNally29 and restore the 
broad definition of fraud that had evolved prior to that decision.30 
 
 22. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987), superseded by statute, Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508, as recognized in 
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2904 (2010). 
 23. Id. at 352–54. 
 24. Id. at 352. 
 25. Id. at 360.  
 26. The statute reads, in its entirety: “For the purposes of [mail and wire fraud], the 
term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the 
intangible right of honest services.” Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 
§ 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)). 
 27. See United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 742 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Jolly & 
DeMoss, JJ., dissenting) (discussing the absence of any legislative history).  
 28. Id. 
 29. See 134 CONG. REC. 33,297 (1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (“This 
amendment restores the mail fraud provision to where that provision was before the 
McNally decision.”); 134 CONG. REC. S17,376 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement of Sen. 
Biden) (“This section overturns the decision in McNally v. United States . . . . Under the 
amendment, [the fraud] statutes will protect any person’s intangible right to the honest 
services of another, including the right of the public to the honest services of public 
officials.”). 
 30. See Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 19–20 (2000). 
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Codifying the expansion of fraud liability to cases of “intangible” 
rights violations thus did nothing at all to clarify how far the statute 
ultimately extends. The courts had allowed prosecutors to press 
beyond the property boundary, and it then fell entirely to the courts 
to redefine the limits of prosecutorial discretion once that line was 
crossed.31 Among the disadvantages of this interstitial development of 
the law was that, while fluid and responsive, it also created 
inconsistency. Between enactment of § 1346 and the Court’s decision 
in Skilling, conflicts arose among the federal circuits with respect to 
the appropriate mens rea standard, the significance of loss and gain, 
the nature of the duty of good faith, and the body of law governing 
whether that duty had been breached.32 Many of the differences in 
interpretation turned on whether and to what extent prosecutors had 
to demonstrate harm.33 Some courts required only that harm be 
reasonably foreseeable,34 while others called for some showing that 
the defendant caused actual harm or achieved some measurable 
gain.35  
 
 31. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and 
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 764 (1999) (observing that the legislative 
and executive branches have pushed a broad conception of discretionary enforcement 
power in an ongoing conversation with the courts). 
 32. Compare Brumley, 116 F.3d at 735 (“The reference to such [intangible] ‘rights’ of 
citizens has little relevant meaning beyond a shorthand statement of a duty rooted in state 
law and owed to the state employer. Despite its rhetorical ring, the rights of citizens to 
honest government have no purchase independent of rights and duties locatable in state 
law. To hold otherwise would offer § 1346 as an enforcer of federal preferences of ‘good 
government’ with attendant potential for large federal inroads into state matters and 
genuine difficulties of vagueness. Congress did not use those words, and we will not supply 
them.”), with United States v. Martin, 195 F.3d 961, 966 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
fiduciary duty, the breach of which was charged as mail fraud, had its source in federal—
not state—law). See also United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 300 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(decrying the absence of any “clear cut answers to borderline problems”); United States v. 
Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 162–63 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (identifying 
the conflicts in authority).  
 33. Compare United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 655–57 (7th Cir. 1998) (requiring 
that harm—for example, in the form of misuse of a public office for private gain—be 
shown as an element of mail fraud), with United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 692 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (refusing to require misuse of public office for personal gain as an element of 
mail fraud because it “risks being both over-inclusive and under-inclusive as a limiting 
principle”). 
 34. See Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 141 (holding, in the context of private-sector honest 
services fraud, that the defendant’s behavior must “cause, or at least be capable of causing, 
some detriment”).  
 35. See United States v. Jordan, 112 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1074–77 (1st Cir. 1997) (reversing a conviction based on the 
defendant’s unauthorized accessing of confidential tax records because the defendant 
neither intended to disclose nor otherwise used the confidential information for personal 
gain). 
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 The “unprincipled theory of harm” was, for some, the primary 
source of constitutional concern.36 Critics of § 1346 cited these notice 
problems and argued that porous charging provisions can lead to 
arbitrary and even abusive enforcement. Generative prohibitions can 
also unduly empower prosecutors, and detractors from the honest 
services theory raised federalism concerns and the specter of partisan 
motivations or external political pressure on prosecutors as well.37 
Federal prosecutors responded that this catch-all tool was essential in 
order for them to pursue corruption that state and local officials 
might ignore, because they were insufficiently resourced, politically 
vulnerable, or laboring under conflicts of interest.38 Some scholars 
have also cited the important federal role in maintaining the integrity 
of state and local governments in order to preserve the “balance 
established by federalism.”39 A more subtle claim is that federal 
interests are themselves implicated in the prosecution of state and 
 
 36. See United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 534–35 (5th Cir. 2006) (DeMoss, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 37. See, e.g., Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (arguing that the statute “invites abuse by headline-grabbing 
federal prosecutors in pursuit of local officials, state legislators, and corporate CEOs”); 
United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 949–50 (9th Cir.) (Berzon, J., 
concurring) (“The conflict of interest theory, unhinged from an external disclosure 
standard, places too potent a tool in the hands of zealous prosecutors who may be guided 
by their own political motivations. . . . [and] might also feel political pressure to pursue 
certain state or local officials . . . .”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 795 (2009), abrogated in part by 
United States v. Jaramillo, No. 09-50480, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3036, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 
15, 2011). On the potential for improper purposes like political motivations to taint factual 
interpretation by prosecutors, see, for example, Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design 
and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 
903 (2009); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the 
Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 188 (2008). 
  Prosecutors implementing the honest services provision also acted without any 
centralized authority to review indictments. In contrast, for example, to RICO 
prosecutions, some money laundering cases, and prosecutions involving election fraud, the 
Department of Justice has not required prior approvals before individual U.S. attorney’s 
offices proceed with fraud cases that rest on intangible rights theories. See Ellen S. Podgor, 
Intangible Rights—A Déjà Vu, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 63, 68–69 (2010); Richman, 
supra note 31, at 802–03. 
 38. See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT 187–88 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing constitutional origins of the federal 
government’s role in policing state and local corruption); Norman Abrams, The Distance 
Imperative: A Different Way of Thinking About Public Official Corruption 
Investigations/Prosecutions and the Federal Role, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 207, 230–33 (2011).  
 39. Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State and Local 
Corruption, 92 KY. L.J. 75, 81 (2003); see also id. at 82 (“The constitutional design to 
eliminate corruption demonstrates the Framers’ intent to guard against the threat to 
liberty from the misuse of public authority.”). 
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local corruption, and fraud prosecutions at times provide the only 
vehicle for protecting those interests.40 
B. The Skilling Decision 
Mounting criticism that judicial gap-filling in the statute was 
actually too dynamic finally prompted the Supreme Court in 2009 to 
grant certiorari in a trio of cases concerning § 1346.41 Honest services 
prosecutions had long been “searching in a Pirandello-like fashion for 
a plot,”42 and Justice Scalia had recently decried the absence of 
limiting principles and the statute’s reach to “any manner of 
unappealing or ethically questionable conduct.”43 Weyhrauch, 
Skilling, and Black together offered an opportunity to resolve the 
constitutionality of the statute and determine its outer boundaries. 
Bruce Weyhrauch was an Alaska legislator who was poised to 
leave government for private law practice and allegedly sought future 
legal work from an oil field services company. Weyhrauch failed to 
disclose that conflict of interest and voted in the company’s favor on a 
pending oil tax bill.44 The Court agreed to review his conviction for 
honest services fraud and, in particular, to decide whether charges 
against a state official for depriving the public of honest services 
required a showing that the defendant had violated a disclosure duty 
imposed by state law.45 That issue had divided the appeals courts and 
presented a fairly narrow question, but two companion cases from the 
private sector—United States v. Skilling and United States v. Black—
added broader debates about how to distinguish lawful from unlawful 
conduct under the statute. 
Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s CEO, was indicted in 2004 for securities 
fraud and mail and wire fraud.46 Among the allegations in the mail 
 
 40. See Sara Sun Beale, An Honest Services Debate, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 251, 266 
(2010) (“Of course federal prosecutions of state and local corruption raise federalism 
concerns. But there are countervailing interests as well. In addition to the inability of state 
and local actors to respond effectively when corruption is entrenched and pervasive, other 
federal interests may be implicated. In the Weyhrauch case, the corruption affected critical 
legislation on oil field production. Rod Blagojevich was prosecuted for trying to sell the 
nomination for the U.S. Senate seat vacated by Barack Obama.”). 
 41. Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (per curiam); Black v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010); Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
 42. Coffee, supra note 15, at 430. 
 43. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
 44. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. 
Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 45. United States v. Weyhrauch, 129 S. Ct. 2863, 2863 (2009) (granting certiorari). 
 46. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907. 
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fraud counts was the claim that Skilling had deprived Enron and its 
shareholders of the intangible right to his honest services when he 
deceived them and the public about the company’s financial status in 
order to inflate its stock price.47 Skilling raised the question whether 
§ 1346 requires the government to prove that the defendant’s conduct 
was intended to achieve some private gain rather than to advance the 
employer’s interests.48 
The Court also granted certiorari in Black v. United States, which 
concerned the status of a harm-based narrowing construction. The 
charges arose from Canadian newspaper magnate Conrad Black’s 
concealment of the recharacterization of management fees to 
manipulate after-tax income, and from Black’s collection of non-
compete payments that functioned as disguised bonuses to him.49 One 
of the issues presented was whether, in order to prove that Black 
deprived his company, Hollinger International, of honest services, the 
government had to demonstrate “a reasonably contemplated 
identifiable economic harm” to the victim.50 
Despite this promising constellation of issues, the Supreme 
Court’s ultimate decision failed to engage the core concerns about 
honest services fraud. Rather, the Court cited constitutional 
avoidance and addressed the vagueness challenge by circumscribing 
the application of § 1346 to cases of “bribes and kickbacks.”51 As Sam 
Buell commented, “difficult problems in the criminal law of fraud are 
likely to persist with nearly as much force in the wake of the Court’s 
big ‘mail fraud’ trilogy as they did before its arrival.”52 The failure of 
the decision is in large measure procedural rather than substantive. 
The Court’s solution could be read as a mechanical overcorrection 
that strips § 1346 of any content independent of parallel prohibitions 
(if bribes and kickbacks are taken as terms of art), or as the 
meaningless addition of two more undefined terms to the already 
ambiguous language of § 1346 (if many different forms of conduct fit 
 
 47. See id. at 2908. 
 48. See id. at 2928 n.36. 
 49. See United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 
2963 (2010). 
 50. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Black v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2379 
(2009) (No. 08-876). 
 51. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931. Justice Scalia’s concurrence states his view that the 
statute as a whole is unconstitutionally vague because it provides “no ascertainable 
standard of guilt.” Id. at 2936 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. L. Cohen 
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52. Samuel W. Buell, The Court’s Fraud Dud, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 
32 (2010). 
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within the new bribery paradigm). Its substantive impact thus remains 
to be determined. Procedurally, though, the decision reads like an 
abrupt end to an interbranch conversation that began in the 1940s, 
continued through prosecutors’ most recent efforts to curb public 
corruption, and included the lower courts’ various attempts to impose 
appropriate limits on that power. By declining to tackle the questions 
that had divided the lower courts, including the sources of fiduciary 
duties and the place of harm and gain in determining whether those 
duties had been breached, the Court disregarded the common law 
nature of the offense. 
II.  CONCEPTUALIZING CORRUPTION 
Courts should be explicit about the difficulties of marking out the 
precise contours of corruption in advance, and the need to work 
within broader strokes.53 Regulating public corruption through the 
criminal law has unavoidably engaged them in fact-specific inquiries 
and some accretive crime definition. And the de facto common law 
status of honest services fraud by public officials comports with the 
nature of the regulated conduct and the enforcement goals. It became 
untethered from traditional conceptions of money or property loss 
because the harm that it causes has broad normative content. Both 
theoretical approaches to the meaning of corruption and the language 
of corruption prosecutions stress concerns like integrity, fidelity, and 
transparency, and preserving those values requires a pliant statutory 
scheme. 
A. Common Law Crimes 
To point out the merits of analyzing honest services fraud as a 
common law offense is to advocate for something that does not exist 
in theory. Since the First Congress, it has been axiomatic that there 
are no federal common law crimes,54 and Justice Scalia recently 
restated this “rule” and criticized the “common-law crime of 
 
 53. Cf. United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 24 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in part) (“If judges perceive a need for a catch-all federal common law 
crime, the issue should be addressed explicitly with some recognition of the dangers, 
rather than continue an inexorable expansion of the mail and wire fraud statutes under the 
pretense of merely discharging Congress’ will.”). 
 54. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); see also 
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[L]egislatures and not courts should 
define criminal activity.”); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943) (“There is no 
common law offense against the United States . . . .”); Jeffries, supra note 6, at 195 
(“Judicial crime creation is a thing of the past.”); Kahan, supra note 19, at 366 (observing 
that courts have displayed “antagonism toward analogical reasoning”). 
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unethical conduct” that developed around § 1346.55 Numerous 
scholars of criminal law have explained, however, that courts 
necessarily add meaning to criminal statutes,56 and that the refrain 
against interstitial lawmaking relies on a “truth so partial that it is 
nearly a lie.”57 As Dan Kahan notes, although it is an 
unacknowledged practice, it is nevertheless a well-established one 
that “Congress may delegate criminal lawmaking power to the 
courts.”58 Similarly, Dan Richman observes that the extent of 
delegated enforcement in the criminal realm is commensurate with 
delegations in other parts of the “bureaucratic state.”59 
 
 55. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). Justice Scalia’s objection in Sorich evokes the core concern about 
common law crimes, that “[i]t is simply not fair to prosecute someone for a crime that has 
not been defined until the judicial decision that sends him to jail.” Id.; see also United 
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) (“It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature 
could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to 
step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.”); 
United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 522 n.13 (5th Cir. 2006) (commenting on the 
dangers of the “ever-expanding and ever-evolving federal common-law crime” of honest 
services fraud). 
 56. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 469, 471 (1996) (“To be sure, Congress must speak before a person can be convicted 
of a federal crime, but it needn’t say much of anything when it does.”); see also Mark 
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 
660 (1981) (observing that “the ‘rule system’ is upheld only occasionally, and in a very un-
rule-like fashion”). But see Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: 
An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 
635 (2005) (noting that judges formerly played a more significant role in defining 
exceptions and defenses to criminal offenses established by the legislature). 
 57. Kahan, supra note 56, at 471. The refrain that there are no federal common law 
crimes sounds periodically in the case law as well. See, e.g., United States v. Bloom, 149 
F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is frightening to contemplate the prospect that the 
federal mail fraud statute makes it a crime punishable by five years’ imprisonment to 
misunderstand how a state court in future years will delineate the extent of impermissible 
conflicts . . . . [In that case,] we would have a federal common-law crime, a beastie that 
many decisions say cannot exist.”). But see United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 965–
66 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that Congress intended the definition of a term 
in a statute “to be developed in the common law tradition of case-by-case adjudication”), 
superseded by statute, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-386, § 112(a)(2), 114 Stat. 1464, 1486–89. 
 58. Kahan, supra note 19, at 347. 
 59. Richman, supra note 31, at 760; see also McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 
372–73 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Statutes like the Sherman Act, the civil rights 
legislation, and the mail fraud statute were written in broad general language on the 
understanding that the courts would have wide latitude in construing them to achieve the 
remedial purposes that Congress had identified.”), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508, as recognized in 
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2904 (2010).  
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There are practical and policy reasons to recognize this reality, as 
“[t]he same constraints that prevent Congress from enacting a 
detailed solution to a complex or controversial problem may also 
prevent Congress from adapting any such solution to changed 
circumstances.”60 Congress has “every incentive” to proceed in the 
criminal realm just as it does in the civil one, “resorting to highly 
general language that facilitates legislative consensus by deferring 
resolution of controversial points to the moment of judicial 
application.”61 Legislative efforts to articulate detailed theories of 
offenses can also be cumbersome and can quickly grow outdated.62 
And criminal rulemaking in its legislative form often unfolds in 
reaction to high-visibility cases or regulatory problems that are 
perceived as acute.63 The standards set in that reactive mode may 
later scale poorly to the workaday applications that prosecutors 
pursue. Common law crime definition allows for a more gradual 
response, with occasional distortions arising from high-profile cases64 
 
 60. Kahan, supra note 19, at 352; see also id. at 353 (“[O]pen-textured statutory 
language may facilitate more efficient updating of legal norms; the generality of these 
statutes means that courts can modify or overrule prior decisions without awaiting 
amendment of the statutory language by Congress.”). 
 61. Id. at 369–70. William Stuntz adds that a common law system of criminal law holds 
the potential to produce supermajoritarian rules. See William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating 
Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1895 (2000). 
 62. See, e.g., Honest Services Restoration Act, S. 3854, 111th Cong. (2010) (stating 
that the Act’s purpose was to “expand the definition of scheme or artifice to defraud with 
respect to mail and wire fraud”). The Honest Services Restoration Act was an attempt to 
respond to the Skilling decision by recriminalizing undisclosed conflict-of-interest 
violations in necessarily underinclusive detail. Press Release, Patrick Leahy, Leahy 
Introduces Bill to Address Supreme Court’s Skilling Decision (Sept. 28, 2010), 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=d6346bbc-22d0-40a8-832b-
017465c53ce8. Although the legislation attempted a comprehensive definition of the 
public officials to whom its terms applied, the official duties it contemplated, and the 
prohibited benefits that had to be disclosed, it was a self-contained demonstration of the 
difficulty of answering those questions ex ante. The Honest Services Restoration Act 
remained in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary at the end of 2010. A similar bill has 
been introduced in the 112th Congress. See Honest Services Restoration Act, H.R. 1468, 
112th Cong. (2011). 
 63. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for example, was a response to the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals of the early 2000s. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 
116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).  
 64. This concern applies at the margins to the high-profile cases that often produce 
adjustments to legal standards as well. See Frederick Schauer & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 
The Trouble with Cases, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES ON 
ECONOMICS AND LAW 45, 63 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011) (“[T]he problem of the 
distortingly available example is almost always a problem with regulation by litigation, but 
only sometimes—even if increasingly—a problem with ex ante rule-making.”); see also 
Buell, supra note 8, at 1522 (“If prosecutors tend to select threatening actors for sanction 
GRIFFIN.BKI 5/5/2011  1:00 PM 
2011] COMMON LAW CRIME OF CORRUPTION 1829 
 
but a flexible quality that suits the dynamic nature of many modern 
crimes. 
This has been particularly true when it comes to the law of 
criminal fraud. Fraud is about gaining advantage through deception,65 
and that is a concept so encompassing that it cannot be definitively 
expressed ex ante. Fraud is inherently evasive, often inventive, and 
context dependent. Corruption prosecutions evolved as a subset of 
fraud enforcement in part because the two concepts share important 
characteristics. Corruption likewise takes creative forms and occurs in 
relationships structured to avoid detection.66 Moreover, although the 
norms against deceptive practices are at least somewhat stable, the 
norms concerning what constitutes “corrupt” behavior by public 
officials shift, vary across jurisdictions, and interact with the 
regulation of political campaigns. Interstitial lawmaking allows the 
offense definition to keep pace with evolving forms of misconduct to 
protect an important but imprecise set of interests.  
B. The Harm of Corruption 
Disloyalty in general defies quantification, and the harm of 
dishonest government is no exception. Even the more straightforward 
bribery statute raises what David Mills and Robert Weisberg have 
identified as a “basic philosophical challenge.”67 Bribery typically 
involves a consensual arrangement and the exchange of something of 
material value, but “the most significant ‘thing taken’ by the 
malefactors is the public’s entitlement to uncorrupted loyalty of 
service by government officials, something impossible to measure.”68 
Although the harm of public corruption cannot be measured 
precisely, some effort to express what corrupt conduct actually 
 
under broad liability rules, judges, seeing the serious wrongs that narrow interpretations of 
rules would exclude from sanctioning regimes, will resist narrow rulings.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 312–13 (1896). 
 66. Cf. United States v. Laljie, 184 F.3d 180, 194 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing application 
of section 3B1.3 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and querying whether the defendant 
possessed “ ‘substantial discretionary judgment’ ” in a relationship of trust that yielded the 
“ ‘freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong’ ” (quoting U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (1998); United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 45 (2d 
Cir. 1994))).  
 67. David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White 
Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1393 (2008). 
 68. Id.; see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory 
of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 786 (1985) (describing corruption as a “black core” of 
bribery with “gray circles [that] surround the bribery core, growing progressively lighter” 
until they “blend into the surrounding white area that represents perfectly proper and 
innocent conduct”).  
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damages or degrades is essential to defining the offense.69 
Articulating either the conduct rule (a guide to the actions public 
officials are prohibited from taking) or the decision rule (according to 
which enforcers draw lines around cases to be prosecuted)70 starts 
with the core concerns about distorting the decisions of public 
officials.  
 The law of public corruption, according to Samuel Issacharoff’s 
recent analysis, is preoccupied with ensuring “public” rather than 
“private” outputs from the government and avoiding a client 
relationship between elected officials and contributors.71 A related 
conception arises from political philosophy and trusteeship theory: 
the idea that public officials must privilege the public interest rather 
than either political considerations or private gain.72 Case law also 
stresses general ideals of “good government,” including unbiased 
decisionmaking and the fair and open exchange of information.73 
Other descriptions of corruption enforcement focus on the integrity 
of the electoral process instead of the outputs or functions of 
government.74 Regulating corruption can also be viewed as animated 
by equality principles, by a desire for maximum reflection of 
divergent political views, or by a concern for the legitimacy of public 
officials. No entirely unifying theory emerges from the corruption 
laws, and political theorists evaluating them have relied on “vague 
criteria such as consensus notions of the public interest or culture-
specific norms.”75 
 
 69. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure 
and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 73–74 (1997) (“There is no nonarbitrary way to 
arrive at the proper legal rules, no way to get to sensible bottom lines by something that 
looks and feels like legal analysis. . . . [C]ourts’ decisions . . . are embedded in a system 
shaped by more open-ended—and more flagrantly political—judgments: How bad should 
something be before we call it a crime?”). 
 70. See Meir Dan Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation 
in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630–31 (1984). 
 71. See Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 126–30 
(2010). 
 72. See Lowenstein, supra note 68, at 833. 
 73. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 366 (1987) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the right to “honest government” and “unbiased public officials”), 
superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 
4181, 4508, as recognized in Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2904 (2010).  
 74. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 76 (1980) (“[I]t is an 
appropriate function of the Court to keep the machinery of democratic government 
running as it should, to make sure the channels of political participation and 
communication are kept open.”). 
 75. Mills & Weisberg, supra note 67, at 1381 (discussing Lowenstein, supra note 68, at 
791–95); see also United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 736 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) 
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Accordingly, as Mills and Weisberg have explained, the victim of 
public corruption is always a constructed one, an “abstraction.”76 The 
harm done takes shape through the “conceptual expressions of the 
courts, abetted of course by prosecutorial arguments and the framing 
of indictments.”77 What finds expression in many court opinions is the 
notion that corruption undercuts aspirations for honesty, openness, 
and free-flowing information.78 The Sixth Circuit, for example, has 
stated that “the right of the public to the honest services of its officials 
derives at least in part from the concept that corruption and 
denigration of the common good violates ‘the essence of the political 
contract.’ ”79 Some of the earliest cases recognizing the honest 
services theory also cited its role in protecting “moral uprightness, . . . 
fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing.”80 Those terms have 
frequently reappeared, as in the 2005 federal indictment alleging that 
Representative Randy “Duke” Cunningham 
conspired and agreed to devise a material scheme to defraud 
the United States of its right to defendant’s honest services, 
including its right to his conscientious, loyal, faithful, 
disinterested, unbiased service, to be performed free of deceit, 
undue influence, conflict of interest, self-enrichment, self-
dealing, concealment, bribery, fraud, and corruption . . . .81 
Highlighting honest and open government as the primary target 
of corruption enforcement merely begins the definitional work. 
Almost every elected official has engaged in conduct that fits 
somewhere within the broad allegations of moral disloyalty in the 
 
(Jolly & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting) (stating that courts applying the statute are “somewhere 
between a philosopher king and a legislator”). 
 76. Mills & Weisberg, supra note 67, at 1372. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1361 (4th Cir.) (explaining that 
the mail fraud statute covers any “scheme involving deception that employs the mails in its 
execution that is contrary to public policy and conflicts with accepted standards of moral 
uprightness, fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing”), aff’d in part, 602 F.2d 653 
(4th Cir. 1979) (en banc). 
 79. United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 365 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. 
Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
 80. Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958); see also, e.g., Shushan 
v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941) (referencing the “sacred duties” of a 
public official and the “essential immorality” of gaining advantage through corrupting or 
unduly influencing an official), overruled by United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408, 412 (5th 
Cir. 1973). 
 81. Information at 3–4, United States v. Cunningham, No. 05 CR 2137 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 
28, 2005). 
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Cunningham indictment and in the spare terms of the statute.82 Open-
textured rules may provide the level of flexibility that enforcers need, 
but common law limitations like harm must then draw some 
boundaries between frivolous and meritorious cases. 
III.  USING HARM AS AN ADAPTIVE SORTING PRINCIPLE 
The Skilling, Black, and Weyhrauch cases presented an 
opportunity to conform the definition of honest services to the goals 
of the enforcement scheme. The Court instead shifted the focus away 
from questions about the harm or impact of offense conduct and 
toward the form that corruption takes. The Court reasoned that the 
earliest honest services fraud cases—those that arose before the 
interaction between the Court and Congress in McNally and § 1346—
tended to involve paradigm situations of bribes or kickbacks. By 
carving away all of the other theories of honest services violations, the 
Court ostensibly resolved the vagueness problems with the statute.83 
This development has made it harder, but not impossible, to imagine 
a limiting principle that suits the nature of corruption and sorts for 
the most serious cases. The decision left many questions unanswered 
about the meaning of “bribes and kickbacks,” as well as the extent to 
which cases that do not fit within that framework can nonetheless be 
prosecuted as pecuniary frauds. Harm considerations inform the 
approach to those issues and aid in the ongoing effort to delineate the 
boundaries of the offense. 
A. A More Contextual Definition of Corruption 
An intriguing feature of the Court’s interpretation is that it 
creates both over- and underbreadth. Scholarship on white collar 
crime often highlights the overcriminalization in federal law by 
reciting a litany of superfluous statutes and cases of prosecutorial 
overreaching.84 Slippery offense definitions typically prompt criticism 
because they allow for prosecutions of innocuous conduct. According 
to Justice Scalia, § 1346, pre-Skilling, could  
 
 82. Cf. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 684 (1990) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“[V]irtually anything the Court deems politically undesirable can be turned 
into political corruption—by simply describing its effects as politically ‘corrosive.’ ”), 
overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882 (2010). 
 83. United States v. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2928–31 (2010). 
 84. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals 
and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 755–56 (2005). 
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render[] criminal a state legislator’s decision to vote for a bill 
because he expects it will curry favor with a small minority 
essential to his reelection; a mayor’s attempt to use the prestige 
of his office to obtain a restaurant table without a reservation; 
[or] a public employee’s recommendation of his incompetent 
friend for a public contract.85 
The limitation to bribes and kickbacks, though, excised not only 
this specter of prosecutorial opportunism but also conflict-of-interest 
cases with important public policy dimensions. Thus, the narrowed 
version of honest services opens a window on a different subset: 
factual scenarios in which the merits of prosecution seem obvious but 
the option to pursue charges no longer exists. Many of the situations 
the courts confronted in the honest services context involved bribes 
and kickbacks, but there were also many prosecutions, both pre-
McNally and post-section 1346, that did not.86 Bribes and kickbacks 
do not necessarily demarcate the most salient cases of harm to the 
political process. Small favors that have no longstanding influence 
present less compelling facts than undisclosed self-dealing that 
compromises a lawmaker’s integrity.87 But after Skilling, political 
nest-feathering may not be actionable absent a direct link between 
the benefit and official action. 
A closer look at the facts of four honest services cases 
demonstrates the potential for a more adaptive approach that 
includes an account of harm. Recall that in McNally, Kentucky 
officials directed the state to buy insurance through an agent who 
shared commissions with another agency partly owned by one of the 
officials.88 Because the insurance policies provided the requisite 
 
 85. Sorich v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1308, 1309 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
 86. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2932 (noting that there were pre-McNally convictions for 
“ ‘schemes of non-disclosure and concealment of material information’ ” but “no 
consensus on which scheme[s] qualified” (quoting United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 
1361 (4th Cir. 1979))); see also Coffee, supra note 15, at 459–60 (“In public fiduciary cases, 
the pre-McNally standards apply, and § 1346 can be applied to the conduct of state 
officials who receive undisclosed financial benefits or who have undisclosed financial 
interests in connection with transactions before them.”). 
 87. See Beale, supra note 40, at 268 (“Bribes and kickbacks may or may not be 
particularly harmful. It depends on a variety of factors including the size of the bribe or 
kickback and the effect of the payments. On the other hand, some self-dealing and/or 
other undisclosed conflicts of interest could have a much greater impact than a small bribe 
or kickback.”). 
 88. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 352 (1987), superseded by statute, Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508, as recognized in 
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2904. 
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coverage at market rates, the state did not suffer economic injury. 
This is efficient corruption, the sort of dishonesty that does not affect 
whether the streets are plowed or the buildings are constructed to 
code.89 Although corruption that does not impact public funds or 
constituent services might be termed “high functioning”—Chicago, 
after all, is the “City that Works”—it can nonetheless cause 
significant social harm. The loss to the public in McNally stemmed 
not from the kickback itself but from withheld information about the 
divided loyalty of the officials and its potential impact on their public 
duties. But the Skilling decision, if left unrefined, precludes 
prosecutions based solely on a conflict-of-interest theory. 
Weyhrauch90 offers a more recent illustration of the 
underbreadth that can result from the wholesale removal of self-
dealing from the honest services theory. Seeking a job from an oil 
field services company while supporting oil tax legislation favored by 
the firm closely relates to straightforward corruption. It does not 
involve extorting a briefcase full of cash from an interested party, but 
it does implicate the harm to disinterested decisionmaking that 
corruption prosecutions seek to prevent. Because that harm stems 
from an indirect exchange, the conduct may no longer fit within the 
statutory scheme. The case is pending on remand, but the Ninth 
Circuit has ruled that evidence concerning Weyhrauch’s conflict of 
interest with respect to future employment is no longer admissible 
because nondisclosure of that conflict forms no basis for prosecution 
after Skilling.91 As with McNally, however, there is more to the loss 
than nondisclosure. The concealment is harmful because it masks self-
dealing that deprives the public of its right to unbiased 
decisionmaking. There is no bribe per se, and the gain to Weyhrauch 
 
 89. Other scholars analyzing corruption have suggested that in some contexts, it can 
produce net benefits, particularly in developing countries. Mills and Weisberg note that 
“[t]o the legal economist, in a second-best world with preexisting policy-induced 
distortions, graft may sometimes encourage productive economic transactions and prod 
the government to help entrepreneurs at critical times in economic development by 
reducing the uncertainties of investment.” Mills & Weisberg, supra note 67, at 1379. 
Corruption, they explain, “can be a force for democracy, or at least egalitarian 
distribution, and it is an open question whether a fair and honest public administration can 
accomplish these things better than petty bribery can.” Id. A similar argument can be 
made with respect to communist countries, where “[u]nder the so-called ‘covert 
participant’ model, a dominant private ethos can be harmonious with the government, as 
individual self-interest can lead an official to disdain official rules, but at the same time, to 
aim for higher system outputs.” Id. 
 90. Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (per curiam).  
 91. See United States v. Weyhrauch, 623 F.3d 707, 708 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding the 
trial court’s exclusion of evidence relating to Weyhrauch’s concealed conflict of interest). 
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is neither immediate nor easy to identify; but his tainted vote alone 
may harm the integrity of the political process. 
Sorich—the case that prompted Justice Scalia’s impassioned 
dissent from the denial of certiorari and primed the Court for the 
Skilling trio the following term—arguably lies on the other side of this 
harm boundary.92 There, the defendants were city employees in 
Chicago’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs. They engaged in 
patronage hiring and promotions in civil service jobs according to a 
list they received from campaign coordinators, and that favoritism 
violated a consent decree banning city promotions and hiring based 
on political factors.93 The government’s theory was that the 
employees breached their duty of honest services to abide by the 
decree, even though they received no direct economic benefit from 
the patronage. Although they did not enrich themselves, they did 
improperly reward the thousands of individuals who received the city 
jobs and promotions.94 The Seventh Circuit agreed that the 
illegitimate gain from the “dishonest services” could flow to parties 
other than the defendants.95 Defendants actively concealed the 
scheme and therefore fit within the pre-Skilling conflict-of-interest 
paradigm. In the absence of some pecuniary gain to conceal, however, 
the harm the Sorich defendants caused might be insufficient to 
support prosecution under § 1346 post-Skilling. 
At the far end of this spectrum of potential harms lies the 
Thompson96 case. In Thompson, a Wisconsin state employee 
circumvented a bidding process to award a government contract to a 
politically connected travel agency that was also the low bidder.97 The 
prosecution’s theory was that a politically motivated departure from 
state administrative rules could be characterized as a deprivation of 
honest services, and thus that Thompson’s effort to please her 
supervisors sufficed for liability.98 The Seventh Circuit reversed 
 
 92. See Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310–11 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari).  
 93. Id. 
 94. See United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2008). The government’s 
primary argument was that a scheme to defraud exists where there is “personal gain to a 
member of the scheme or another.” Id. (emphasis added). Alternatively, the government 
asserted that to the extent third-party gain was insufficient, the error was nonetheless 
harmless because the defendants also gained “job security for keeping the patronage 
machine running.” Id.  
 95. Id. at 709. 
 96. United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 97. Id. at 878–79.  
 98. Id. at 882. 
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Thompson’s conviction immediately after hearing oral argument and 
cited her case as a self-contained demonstration of the dangers of 
“ambulatory criminal prohibitions” like § 1346.99 “Haziness designed 
to avoid loopholes through which bad persons can wriggle,” Judge 
Easterbrook wrote, “can impose high costs on people the statute was 
not designed to catch.”100 Not only was Thompson “doing her job,” as 
in Sorich, but she was also “pursu[ing] the public interest as [she] 
understood it.”101 While Thompson’s decisionmaking was not entirely 
disinterested, her ordinary professional motivations (including 
favorable job evaluations and receiving a $1,000 raise in her annual 
salary) did not breach the public trust in the same way that self-
dealing would.102 
A purposive view of public-sector corruption prosecutions 
suggests some important distinctions between the Weyhrauch and 
Thompson cases. Focusing on the underlying goals of regulating 
public corruption through the criminal law—not just the meaning of 
the words in the statute, but the point of drafting them in the first 
place—reveals potential categories of conflict-of-interest cases that 
may still be subject to prosecution as honest services fraud.103 If 
Weyhrauch took actions favorable to a potential employer with the 
understanding that he would receive future work, the favorable 
actions themselves “could be sufficient to show a bribe.”104 
Thompson, in contrast, acted under some institutional pressures but 
reached the same conclusion that a totally honest official would have 
made, without regard to any undisclosed financial interest. 
B. A Focus on Failures of Detached Decisionmaking 
The material costs of political corruption are diffuse, largely 
incalculable, and at times nonexistent, but the social costs—to the 
 
 99. Id. at 884. 
 100. Id. For further discussion of this case, see Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity 
and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 388–90 (2009). 
 101. Thompson, 484 F.3d at 884. 
 102. Id. (concluding that it would stretch the notion of “private gain” to include “a 
public employee’s regular compensation, approved through above-board channels”); cf. 
United States v. Defries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (determining that making 
the same decision as a “totally honest official” cannot give rise to fraud liability). 
 103. Douglas Husak has advocated for criminalizing only conduct that causes 
“nontrivial harms” and for reviewing statutes to ensure that they serve significant 
government interests. HUSAK, supra note 7, at 66–67; see also STEPHEN BREYER, 
MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 94–98 (2010) (supporting statutory interpretation that 
aligns with broader legislative goals). 
 104. HENNING & RADEK, supra note 20, at 163.  
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political process, the body politic, or the public good—appear more 
plainly in some cases than others. The aspirational conception of 
“good government” is decisionmaking from a baseline position of 
neutrality.105 That is rarely attainable: public officials never proceed in 
a completely disinterested vein, and it would be impossible to 
uncover all of the potential motivations that factor into their 
decisions.106 But certain deviations from that baseline are more 
corrosive than others. Although there are many failures of detached 
decisionmaking, the influence of personal financial gain is 
presumptively unrelated to “voting sentiment.”107 Arguably, 
whenever officials’ hidden motivations are pecuniary ones, 
“nontrivial harm” results.108 
The harm may become sufficiently cognizable only when the 
conflict of interest concerns financial benefits, but the loss itself need 
not be an economic one in order for § 1346 to apply. As Judge Posner 
explained when the Seventh Circuit recently considered the Black 
case on remand, there is still harm where “an employee who is owed 
$100 by his employer forges a check to himself for the amount and 
thus fraudulently appropriates money owed him.”109 Likewise, when a 
public official makes a decision that would otherwise be legitimate 
but fails to disclose a pecuniary interest in the matter, the public 
suffers a loss because it is “deprived of its right either to disinterested 
decisionmaking itself or, as the case may be, to full disclosure as to 
the official’s potential motivation behind an official act.”110 Judge 
 
 105. See Lowenstein, supra note 68, at 834–35. 
 106. Compare Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 111, 115–16 (asserting that motive-based restrictions on official 
behavior are incoherent because it is impossible to distinguish the interest in reelection 
from financial considerations and therefore public-minded from private-minded 
motivation), with Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption: 
Comments on Strauss and Cain, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 176 (“The wrongfulness lies 
in the means of influencing the outcome, not in the outcome itself.”). 
 107. See Lowenstein, supra note 68, at 807. 
 108. See HUSAK, supra note 7, at 66; see also id. at 70–71 (further describing the 
“nontrivial harm” constraint on criminalization and giving it some content through Joel 
Feinberg’s conception of “ ‘setbacks of interests that are wrongs, and wrongs that are 
setbacks to interest’ ” (quoting 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 34 (1988))). 
 109. United States v. Black, 625 F.3d 386, 392 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. 
Richman, 944 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1991)), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. 
Feb. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1038); see United States v. Gole, 158 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 1998); 
see also United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 330 (4th Cir. 2001) (determining that 
“objectively fair” business transactions are not immune from liability under § 1346 if the 
transaction is nonetheless distorted). 
 110. United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 724 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Restoring Key 
Tools to Combat Fraud and Corruption After the Supreme Court’s Skilling Decision: 
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Posner’s hypothetical is reminiscent of both McNally and the 
Supreme Court’s explanation in Skilling that accepting a bribe in 
exchange for awarding a contract is paradigmatic pre-McNally 
corruption, even when the terms of the contract are identical to those 
that would have been negotiated with any other provider.111 Where 
there is financial gain to the defendant, without regard to any 
material loss to constituents, the undisclosed conflict of interest 
breaches norms of fidelity and causes systemic harm. 
C. Points of Entry Post-Skilling 
A standard that culls out secret schemes for private gain may be 
useful to separate significant distortions from trivial conflicts of 
interest, but Skilling’s categorical dismissal of pure self-dealing cases 
seems to preclude this formulation.112 In the private-sector context, 
the Court rejected the government’s argument that honest services 
fraud includes the “taking of official action by the employee that 
furthers his own undisclosed financial interests while purporting to 
act in the interests of those to whom he owes a fiduciary duty.”113 Yet 
even though intangible rights now count only within the bribery 
framework, some self-dealing might produce sufficiently concrete 
 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 44 (2010) [hereinafter 
Restoring Key Tools] (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111 
_senate_hearings&docid=f:64789.pdf (asserting that honest services fraud should extend 
to harm that “undermines people’s faith in their government and destroys the integrity of 
our democracy”). 
 111. United States v. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2926 (2010); see also United States v. 
Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1336, 1337 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (maintaining that cognizable harm 
can stem from “significant intangibles” like the “illusion of unfairness”). 
 112. The Senate has recently considered the need for legislation designed to put self-
dealing back on the table and reach those “public officials who hid[e] their own financial 
interests and then act[] to benefit those interests.” See Restoring Key Tools, supra note 
110, at 46 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); see 
also id. at 36 (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) 
(“A public official who conceals his financial interests and then takes official action to 
advance those interests engages in behavior every bit as corrupt as if he accepts a clear 
bribe from a third party. The Department urges Congress to act quickly to restore our 
ability to prosecute individuals for this kind of undisclosed self-dealing.”).  
 113. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933 n.44 (quoting Brief for the United States at 43–44, 
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (No. 08-1394)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Randall D. Eliason, The Future of Honest Services Fraud, NAT’L L.J., July 5, 2010, at 30, 30 
(“A politician who steers a public contract to his own company commits essentially the 
same wrong as one who accepts a bribe to steer the contract to the bribe payer. In each 
case, the politician’s official actions are being driven not by the public interest, but by the 
politician’s desire to line his own pockets. Both should be paradigm honest-services 
violations, but after Skilling only the bribery case may be prosecuted under § 1346.”). 
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harm to allow for prosecution under a property rights theory of fraud 
instead. Many post-McNally cases upheld fraud convictions on the 
theory that pecuniary fraud was an alternative grounds for 
conviction.114 Post-Skilling, parallel property theories might preserve 
some prosecutions as well. In Sorich, for example, the government 
argued that the harm of the patronage scheme was not merely the 
undisclosed conflict of interest but also the city’s loss of valuable 
assets in the form of the jobs and promotions distributed through the 
scheme.115 
Another conception of property fraud—grounded in the value of 
free-flowing information in the political process—may also support 
conflict-of-interest cases. In Carpenter v. United States,116 the Supreme 
Court recognized that information can be property and thus that 
divulging financial reporting that would affect stock prices deprived 
the Wall Street Journal of the “intellectual property” inherent in its 
right to control the timing of publication.117 Later, the appeals courts 
 
 114. See Ryan v. United States, No. 1:10CV05512, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134912, at 
*84 n.14 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2010) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Catalfo, 64 F.3d 1070, 
1077 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding the conviction under pecuniary fraud theory of an options 
trader who made unauthorized trades because “he deprived [the firm that sponsored him] 
of the right to control its risk of loss, which had a real and substantial value”); United 
States v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding the mail fraud conviction of a 
bank employee who traded on the basis of confidential information obtained from the 
bank, because “it is not idle speculation to conclude that the confidentiality of the 
information was commercially valuable to the bank because breaches of confidentiality 
could harm the bank’s reputation and result in lost business”); Ginsburg v. United States, 
909 F.2d 982, 987 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding, in a § 2255 case, that the defendant lawyer’s 
payment of cash bribes for fixing tax appeals constituted pecuniary fraud because it 
deprived the county of its right to collect taxes from the defendant’s clients); Bateman v. 
United States, 875 F.2d 1304, 1309 (7th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (denying relief on § 2255 
review of an honest services conviction because the defendant’s bid-rigging scheme caused 
his employer “to pay substantially more for equipment than it would have if [the 
defendant] had not engaged in this scheme”); Ranke v. United States, 873 F.2d 1033, 1040 
(7th Cir. 1989) (upholding a conviction based on a commercial kickback scheme because 
the defendant’s employer “was induced to part with its money on the basis of the false 
premise . . . that [defendant] would not receive a portion of that money”)). 
 115. Government’s Consolidated Response to Defendant’s Petition to Vacate and Set 
Aside Judgment and Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 at 8–11, United States v. 
Sorich, No. 10 CV 1069 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2010) (“Defendants took money and property 
under the City’s control for political workers and other favored persons, depriving the City 
of its property rights in those jobs.”); see also United States v. Defries, 43 F.3d 707, 709–10 
& n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (surveying cases recognizing property interests in permits and 
licenses). 
 116. 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
 117. Compare id. at 25–26 (“[The] intangible nature [of the company’s confidential 
business information] does not make it any less ‘property’ . . . .”), with United States v. 
Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1072 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that confidential information may be 
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developed this notion that both the “right to control” information and 
the “deprivation of potentially valuable information” support fraud 
charges independent of the honest services definition.118 And post-
Skilling, some courts have been receptive to arguments relying on 
these cases to fit undisclosed self-dealing within traditional money 
and property theories of fraud.119 Harm or impact again helps draw 
some distinctions: information that could affect financial decisions 
and business conduct if disclosed tends to give rise to a property 
theory. Corruption causes injury to the integrity of the political 
process, and that harm is most acute when public officials act for 
personal gain.120 Accordingly, information about official bias arising 
from pecuniary motives might also be sufficiently high-value to give 
rise to a “property right” in the public sector. 
A focus on the meaning of bribes and kickbacks reveals another 
way in which harm might draw some distinctions while preserving a 
conflict-of-interest theory. “Bribes and kickbacks” are not self-
defining, and it is not clear that the Supreme Court intended them as 
terms of art.121 Some bribery statutes require that payments influence 
particular official actions, but not all pre-McNally bribery cases 
involved quid pro quos. And the common law of corruption 
encompasses cases where public officials receive gifts, conceal them, 
and act to benefit the donor, even when there is no direct connection 
between a specific contribution and an official decision. The Skilling 
decision cites cases accepting this influence-peddling or “stream of 
benefits” theory, perhaps leaving open the possibility that “implicit 
exchange[s]” still constitute bribery.122 Bribing by retainer was 
 
intangible property, although merely accessing it—as opposed to disseminating it—does 
not constitute a deprivation). 
 118. See United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 335 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 119. See, e.g., United States v. Queri, No. 09-CR-418, slip op. at 7–9 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 
2010). 
 120. See HENNING & RADEK, supra note 20, at 157 (“The misuse of authority to 
reward friends or divert benefits for one’s own benefit is a scheme to defraud because the 
breach of fiduciary duty is deceptive, and the gain is a fraud perpetrated on those who 
expect the person to exercise authority honestly.”).  
 121. The Court referred to federal statutes defining bribery and kickback schemes—
including 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 666(a)(2) and 41 U.S.C. § 52(2)—not all of which require a 
quid pro quo exchange of benefits for political favors. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 
2896, 2933–34 (2010). 
 122. United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 281 (3d Cir. 2007), cited in Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 
at 2934; see also United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 352–53 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(concluding that a corrupt agreement to provide a judge with things of value constituted 
bribery even if the cause or proceeding to be influenced was not pending and the parties 
had no specific case in mind), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 136 (2010), cited in Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 
at 2934; United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he requisite quid 
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prominently featured in the prosecutions arising from lawmakers’ 
relationships with lobbyist Jack Abramoff,123 and it played a central 
part in a federal court’s recent decision to uphold Illinois Governor 
George Ryan’s honest services convictions as well.124 Even if this 
conception of a bribe does not comport with the requirement of a 
quid pro quo arrangement, the definition of “kickbacks” appears 
broad enough to include rewards paid after an official action and 
payments made as part of a plan to “improperly obtain” a contract.125 
If harm to the political process factors into the calculus, then 
bribery should include situations where a government official has 
received side payments or other items of value “with the 
understanding that when the payor comes calling, the government 
official will do whatever is asked.”126 The harm, again, stems from the 
failure to provide representation free of self-interest and deception; it 
does not turn on whether the bias occurs in a direct exchange or in an 
ongoing relationship. A “retainer” theory of bribes and kickbacks 
could have salvaged some of the cases dismissed in the wake of the 
 
pro quo for the crimes at issue may be satisfied upon a showing that a government official 
received a benefit in exchange for his promise to perform official acts or to perform such 
acts as the opportunities arise.”), cited in Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2934. 
 123. See, e.g., Information at 6, United States v. Ney, No. 06-cr-272-ESH (D.D.C. Sept. 
15, 2006) (alleging honest services charges based on “taking a stream of things of value 
intending to be influenced to take and to be rewarded for taking a stream of favorable 
official action”). 
  124. See Ryan v. United States, No. 1:10CV055122, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134912, at 
*105–06 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2010). 
 125. See HENNING & RADEK, supra note 20, at 161 (“While the bribe must induce or 
influence the defendant’s action, the kickback need only interfere with the person’s 
exercise of authority, so that the government would not have to prove a quid pro quo 
agreement that links the benefit to a particular government action.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 126. United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 943 n.15 (9th Cir. 2009), 
abrogated in part by United States v. Jaramillo, No. 09-50480, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3036, 
at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 2011). Another example of the sort of conduct that will be excluded 
from honest services prosecutions post-Skilling, in the absence of a broad reading of 
“bribes and kickbacks,” is Mandeville, Louisiana Mayor Eddie Price’s case. Price had his 
sentence reduced from sixty-four to forty months after Skilling was decided because there 
was no quid pro quo connected to the $45,000 in gifts and gratuities that he received and 
failed to report from professional service contractors for the city and developers with 
business before the city. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of La., 
Former Mandeville Mayor Resentenced to 40 Months for Mail Fraud and Tax Evasion 
(Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/lae/news/2010/2010_09_29_eddie 
_price_resent.html; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of La., Former 
Mandeville Mayor Sentenced to over Five Years in Prison for Honest Services Mail Fraud 
and Tax Evasion (June 17, 2010), available at http://neworleans.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/ 
pressrel10/no061710.htm; see also Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Price, No. 2:09-
CR-00343 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 2009) (describing the benefits Price received, including 
vacations and other gifts from companies doing business with the city). 
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Skilling opinion. For example, former North Carolina Lottery 
Commissioner Kevin Geddings—who failed to disclose his financial 
interest in lottery vendors—had his honest services conviction 
vacated because the government acknowledged that “it is no longer a 
federal crime for state public officials to corrupt their public offices 
by engaging in undisclosed self-dealing.”127 
Skilling may leave space for the government to resurrect honest 
services cases by arguing that there is parallel property loss, that the 
information withheld has the status of a property right, or that a 
conflict of interest is the functional equivalent of bribery on retainer. 
Not every case that gives rise to one of these theories will merit 
prosecution, however, and a context-specific inquiry into harm could 
help identify those that do threaten substantial federal interests.  
D. Thresholds of Harm 
Concepts that courts have applied to identify harm in private-
sector cases provide some useful analogues. Frauds in general are 
actionable only if there is both the intent to deceive and some 
“material” deception. The materiality requirement means that the 
fraudulent conduct must be “capable of influencing” the victim,128 or 
in the particular context of honest services fraud, that “the 
misinformation or omission would naturally tend to lead or is capable 
of leading a reasonable employer to change its conduct.”129 Private-
sector cases have maintained the distinction between harm and 
materiality. Every case requires materiality, but only about half of the 
federal circuits require a showing of something like “ ‘reasonably 
foreseeable economic harm’ ” before imposing liability for honest 
services fraud violations.130 In Sam Buell’s terms, this harm might 
 
 127. Government’s Memorandum of Law Regarding Impact of Skilling v. United 
States at 1, Geddings v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 729 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (No. 5:06-CR-
136-1D); see also Indictment at 8, United States v. Bruno, 700 F. Supp. 2d 175 (N.D.N.Y. 
2010) (No. 5:09-CR-00029-GLS) (charging that Bruno “entered into direct and indirect 
financial relationships with persons or entities who were pursuing interests before the 
Legislature or State agencies”); Indictment at 52–54, United States v. Jefferson, 634 F. 
Supp. 2d 595 (E.D. Va. 2009) (No. 1:07CR209) (stating that six of Representative 
Jefferson’s sixteen counts of conviction were for concealed conflicts of interest). 
 128. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999). 
 129. United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 130. United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. 
Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff’d in part 526 U.S. 
398 (1999)); see, e.g., United States v. DeVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that private-sector honest services fraud is actionable only with foreseeable 
economic harm); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 368 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding 
foreseeable economic harm necessary to support an honest services conviction); United 
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include not only actual losses but also “being placed at a risk of loss 
that a person has a right to be free of, or being deprived of the ability 
to exit a relationship in circumstances in which exit likely would have 
been chosen.”131 
With respect to public corruption, which involves a more general 
threat of harm to the public welfare, the meaning of “material” 
merges with the source of loss. Borrowing from the private-sector 
definitions, bribes obtained or information withheld are material 
when “capable of influencing” the victim—that is, when the 
undisclosed bias or benefit would be significant to the public. In one 
sense, shifting to Buell’s harm definition, this might mean that voters 
are deprived of honest services when concealed biases, if revealed, 
could prompt voters to “choose to exit” from an electoral 
relationship. There is a similar correspondence between harm and 
gain in most public corruption cases. Detecting side benefits largely 
answers the harm question because the very existence of gain from 
self-dealing is itself harmful to the political process.132 The “nature of 
a political office is the official’s oath to serve the public or the 
electorate,”133 and the hidden influence of any financial incentive 
could create actionable deprivation. 
The boundaries of conflict-of-interest cases cannot, of course, 
encroach on conduct such as campaign contributions that the 
Supreme Court has ruled a legitimate part of the political process. In 
the Citizens United decision, for example, the Court reasoned that 
corporate “speakers” who purchase “influence over or access to 
elected officials” do not necessarily exert sufficient direct pressure to 
endanger representative government.134 Campaign contributions 
require disclosure in many cases, and the analogue to a concealed 
conflict of interest may not arise in the first place. Where the 
 
States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441–42 (8th Cir. 1996) (requiring “harm to the victims’ tangible 
interests” in private-sector cases). 
 131. Buell, supra note 52, at 46. 
 132. Gain has in some cases been treated as a separate inquiry from loss. The Fourth, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits all held before Skilling that § 1346 liability requires 
“[m]isuse of office . . . for private gain.” See, e.g., United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 655 
(7th Cir. 1998). 
 133. Mills & Weisberg, supra note 67, at 1388. 
 134. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010); see also Scott 
Turow, Blagojevich and Legal Bribery, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www 
.nytimescom/2010/08/18/opinion/18turow.html (commenting on the recurring situation in 
which “public officials become the beneficiaries of campaign largesse from those with 
business before them” and noting the First Amendment protections that corporations and 
unions enjoy in making those donations, even though “no idealistic patina of concern 
about good government or values-driven issues can burnish these payments”). 
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contribution is in exchange for specific official action, moreover, the 
core definition of bribery captures the conduct.135 The Blagojevich 
indictment, for instance, includes bribery charges arising from the 
solicitation of campaign donations in exchange for state contracts.136 
The category of cases between protected political activity and 
outright bribery requires further refinement to ensure that there is a 
substantial federal interest in the prosecutions that proceed. 
Undisclosed pecuniary gain causes harm to the political process when 
it leads to decisionmaking that deviates from a baseline position of 
neutrality.137 Not every instance of self-dealing, however, threatens 
the public interest in this fashion. Some sorting is necessary to carve 
out situations where the gain is de minimis and thus no substantial 
distortion in the political process occurs. That threshold might emerge 
from parallel ethics codes and disclosure obligations, or there might 
be a general federal standard that side benefits valued in excess of a 
sum like $5,000 presumptively imperil impartiality.138 Any dollar 
amount will be an imperfect solution to problems of over- and 
underinclusion, but it at least bars prosecution of the most 
insignificant self-dealing and allows prosecutors to take action where 
there are damaging influences.139 Requiring some quantification of 
actual or potential gain also means that courts must address difficult 
measurement problems. At what point do benefits like prospective 
employment, as in Weyhrauch, fit within monetary parameters? And 
 
 135. See United States v. Inzunza, 580 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that the 
quid pro quo must be sufficiently explicit to “distinguish between contributions that are 
given or received with the ‘anticipation’ of official action and contributions that are given 
or received in exchange for a ‘promise’ of official action” (quoting United States v. 
Carpenter, 961 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1992))), amended and superseded by 2011 WL 
1365590 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2011); United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1379 (5th Cir. 
1995) (“Intending to make a campaign contribution does not constitute bribery, even 
though many contributors hope that the official will act favorably because of their 
contributions.”).  
 136. Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 89. 
 137. See Lowenstein, supra note 68, at 834–35. 
 138. Note that there was a $5,000 threshold that would apply only to undisclosed self-
dealing by private-sector defendants in the proposed Honest Services Restoration Act. 
But the draft statute proposed no comparable limitation for public officials. See S. 3854, 
111th Cong. § 2 (2010). And the version of the bill introduced in the 112th Congress 
contains no monetary threshold at all. See Honest Services Restoration Act, H.R. 1468, 
112th Cong. (2011). 
 139. This is not unlike the effort in narcotics statutes to calibrate the severity of the 
offense to the weight of the controlled substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006). Most 
personal-use quantities do not merit forceful prosecutions, even though in some cases the 
defendants are retail-level dealers who may cause substantial social harm. Larger 
quantities more accurately signal broad wrongdoing and generalized harm, and thus a 
substantial federal interest is more apparent in those cases. 
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can valuable but even less quantifiable assistance—like actions taken 
to mitigate reputational harm or help avoid litigation peril—meet a 
numeric threshold? 
Nonetheless, using harm as a limitation accounts for the 
somewhat imprecise purposes of political corruption prosecutions 
while also creating enough friction to score the slippery slope of 
discretion. Justice Scalia’s parade of horribles in Sorich,140 including 
the mayor jumping the queue for a restaurant reservation, could not 
be prosecuted where the harm principle is taken seriously. A public 
figure’s ill manners or imperious nature might matter to voters, but 
getting a table is not a sufficiently pecuniary interest nor is it 
connected to any official act, and the conduct thus does not 
“dishonestly” provide any services. A more developed harm 
consideration might also have protected some of the real defendants 
who became icons of overcriminalization during the honest services 
debate, such as the basketball coaches charged with depriving a 
university of honest services for helping athletes cheat on coursework 
in order to maintain eligibility to play.141 
Harm-based evaluations can do much of the work of screening 
out frivolous cases while ensuring the prosecution of meritorious 
ones.142 Using harm to draw a boundary between legitimate and 
illegitimate official action also responds to notice and vagueness 
concerns.143 Officials engaged in misconduct that strains public trust 
or the social fabric will generally know they have embarked on 
 
 140. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1309 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
 141. United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 777 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 142. Harm also has potential to check prosecutorial discretion and focus prosecutorial 
resources because it is a familiar sorting device for prosecutors. The loss caused or risked 
already occupies a central place among the standards for executive self-regulation. The 
United States Attorney’s Manual, for example, cautions against prosecuting 
“inconsequential cases” and merely “technical” violations, and states that whether there is 
a substantial federal interest in a case turns in large part on the “actual or potential impact 
of the offense on the community and on the victim.” UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S 
MANUAL § 9-27.230 cmt. 2 (1997). Moreover, internal prosecution guidelines concerning 
whether to indict business cases focus on the amount of economic loss. And similar 
conceptions about risk of harm and potential losses move the levers at sentencing as well. 
See generally Frank O. Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing 
Reforms: An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5 (2001) (detailing the 
history and structure of the new economic crime guidelines). 
 143. A frequently cited statement of the vagueness problem that accompanies 
legislative delegation comes from Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 
(1926): “[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague 
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” Id. at 391. 
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wrongdoing.144 A focus on harm also comports with the actual text of 
the statute (which speaks, after all, of “depriving” another of honest 
services), and credits and continues the common law development of 
the offense. Among its drawbacks are harm’s susceptibility to 
outcome-determinative recruitment,145 and lingering practical 
questions about the source of the duty to disclose and how to 
discharge disclosure obligations, including at what point conflicts 
must be revealed and to whom.146 The meaning and merits of the 
Skilling decision, and the administrability concerns that may arise 
from legislative and executive efforts to preserve a self-dealing theory 
under § 1346, warrant more extensive analysis. The analysis here has 
focused on the first-order question whether conceptualizing the loss 
that public corruption causes might help shape efforts to regulate it. 
CONCLUSION 
Just enforcement of the criminal laws requires a high degree of 
consistency, but crime definition must often be receptive as well, and 
public corruption prosecutions have engaged courts in teasing out 
case by case the principles and standards that define harmful 
influences. That common law process gives effect to Congress’s intent 
in § 1346, which was a self-conscious delegation on two fronts. The 
statute uses only twenty-eight words and leaves it to the courts to 
supply limiting principles and monitor extensions, and at the same 
time, it vests substantial discretion in prosecutors to test the 
 
 144. See Coffee, supra note 15, at 461 (suggesting that public officials have implicit 
notice of anticorruption provisions). 
 145. See Avani Mehta Sood & John M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm: An 
Experimental Demonstration of the Malleability of Judgments in the Service of 
Criminalization 1 (July 15, 2010) (unpublished working paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641022 (noting that respondents presented with the 
necessity-of-harm constraint complied not by criminalizing less but by identifying harms 
that had not been reported). But see Nuno Garoupa & Marie Obidzinski, The Scope of 
Punishment: An Economic Theory 9 (Ill. Law & Econ. Research Papers Series, Paper No. 
LE10-06, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1635964 
(arguing that harm-based sanctions are preferable to act-based sanctions when potential 
criminals are better informed about losses, harm avoidance is advisable, changes in the law 
are expensive, and acquiring information is important). 
 146. The Skilling Court sounded a cautionary note about some of these unresolved 
questions: “How direct or significant does the conflicting financial interest have to be? To 
what extent does the official action have to further that interest in order to amount to 
fraud? To whom should the disclosure be made and what information should it convey?” 
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2933 n.44 (2010). If Congress intends to 
criminalize undisclosed self-dealing, the Court wrote, then it must address these issues and 
do so according to “standards of sufficient definiteness and specificity to overcome due 
process concerns.” Id.  
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boundaries of the law.147 The Skilling decision at first glance appears 
to bring the statute’s evolution to a halt by limiting actionable 
deprivations of honest services to bribes and kickbacks. Although the 
Court purported to construe application of § 1346 to reach only cases 
of “ ‘seriously culpable conduct,’ ”148 that category is both broader 
and narrower than bribery. Carving out cases that merit prosecution 
is thus a classic common law undertaking. Common law 
interpretation is incremental and potentially inconsistent, but it is also 
patient and flexible enough to operationalize subtle limiting 
principles like harm. The Court’s analysis does not reject this premise 
entirely; the opinion leaves space for courts to refine the definition of 
bribery to include cases where undisclosed conflicts of interest are the 
functional equivalent of quid pro quo inducements, or where they 
cause injury to the political process analogous to property loss. As 
courts interpret the Skilling decision, and as Congress perhaps reacts 
to it, harm can still serve as an adaptable limitation that is well suited 
to the normative contours of corruption and the dynamic values the 
statute seeks to protect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 147. See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of 
Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 
44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1090 (1993) (“Executive discretion . . . operates as an 
important shock-absorber that protects legislatures from hostile reaction to law 
enforcement operations.”); Stuntz, supra note 69, at 56 (explaining that Congress passes 
broad criminal prohibitions to “make proof of guilt easier, which converts otherwise 
contestable cases into guilty pleas, thereby avoiding most of the costs criminal procedure 
creates”). 
 148. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933 (quoting Brief for Albert W. Alschuler as Amicus 
Curiae at 28–29, Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1196)). 
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